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Abstract
Systematic discriminatory biases present in our
society influence the way data is collected and
stored, the way variables are defined, and the way
scientific findings are put into practice as policy.
Automated decision procedures and learning al-
gorithms applied to such data may serve to perpet-
uate existing injustice or unfairness in our society.
In this paper, we consider how to make optimal
but fair decisions, which “break the cycle of injus-
tice” by correcting for the unfair dependence of
both decisions and outcomes on sensitive features
(e.g., variables that correspond to gender, race,
disability, or other protected attributes). We use
methods from causal inference and constrained
optimization to learn optimal policies in a way
that addresses multiple potential biases which af-
flict data analysis in sensitive contexts, extending
the approach of Nabi & Shpitser (2018). Our pro-
posal comes equipped with the theoretical guaran-
tee that the chosen fair policy will induce a joint
distribution for new instances that satisfies given
fairness constraints. We illustrate our approach
with both synthetic data and real criminal justice
data.
1. Introduction
Making optimal and adaptive intervention decisions in the
face of uncertainty is a central task in precision medicine,
computational social science, and artificial intelligence. In
healthcare, the problem of learning optimal policies is
studied under the heading of dynamic treatment regimes
(Chakraborty & Moodie, 2013). The same problem is called
reinforcement learning in artificial intelligence (Sutton &
Barto, 1998), and optimal stochastic control (Bertsekas &
Tsitsiklis, 1996) in engineering and signal processing. In all
of these cases, a policy (a function of historical data to some
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space of possible actions, or a sequence of such functions)
is chosen to maximize some pre-specified outcome quantity,
which might be abstractly considered a utility (or reward in
reinforcement learning). Increasingly, ideas from optimal
policy learning are being applied in new contexts. In some
areas, particularly socially-impactful settings like criminal
justice, social welfare policy, hiring, and personal finance,
it is essential that automated decisions respect principles
of fairness since the relevant data sets include potentially
sensitive attributes (e.g., race, gender, age, disability status)
and/or features highly correlated with such attributes, so
ignoring fairness considerations may have socially unac-
ceptable consequences. A particular worry in the context of
automated sequential decision making is “perpetuating in-
justice,” i.e., when maximizing utility maintains, reinforces,
or even introduces unfair dependence between sensitive
features, decisions, and outcomes. Though there has been
growing interest in the issues of fairness in machine learn-
ing (Pedreshi et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2015; Hardt et al.,
2016; Kamiran et al., 2013; Corbett-Davies et al., 2017; Jab-
bari et al., 2017; Kusner et al., 2017; Zhang & Bareinboim,
2018; Mitchell & Shalden, 2018; Zhang et al., 2017), so
far methods for optimal policy learning subject to fairness
constraints have not been well-explored.
As a motivating example, we consider a simplified model
for a children’s welfare screening program, recently dis-
cussed in (Chouldechova et al., 2018; Hurley, 2018). A
hotline for child abuse and neglect receives many thousands
of calls a year, and call screeners must decide on the basis
of calculated risk estimates what action to take in response
to any given call, e.g., whether or not to follow up with
an in-person visit from a caseworker. The idea is that only
cases with substantial potential risk to the child’s welfare
should be prioritized. The information used to determine
the calculated risk level and thereby the agency’s action
includes potentially sensitive features, such as race and gen-
der, as well as a myriad of other factors such as perhaps
whether family members receive public assistance, have an
incarceration history, record of drug use, and so on. Though
many of these factors may be predictive of subsequent nega-
tive outcomes for the children, there is a legitimate worry
that both risk calculations and policy choices based on them
may depend on sensitive features in inappropriate ways, and
thereby lead to unfair racial disparities in the distribution
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of families investigated, and perhaps separated, by child
protective services.
Learning high-quality policies that satisfy fairness con-
straints is difficult due to the fact that multiple sources of
bias may occur in the problem simultaneously. One kind of
bias, which we call retrospective bias, has its origin in the
historical data used as input to the policy learning procedure.
This data may reflect various systematic disparities and dis-
criminatory historical practices in our society, including
prior decisions themselves based on poor data. Algorithms
trained on such data can maintain these inequities. Further-
more, decision making algorithms may suffer from what
we call prospective sources of bias. For instance, suppose
the functional form of the chosen decision rule explicitly
depends on sensitive features in inappropriate ways. In that
case, making decisions based on the new decision rule may
perpetuate existing disparities or even introduce disparities
that were previously absent. Avoiding this sort of bias may
involve imposing non-trivial restrictions on the policy learn-
ing procedure. Finally, learning high-quality policies from
observational data requires dealing with confounding bias,
where associations between decision and reward cannot be
used directly to assess decision quality due to the presence
of confounding variables, as well as statistical bias due to
the reliance on misspecified statistical models. Policy learn-
ing algorithms that respect fairness constraints must address
all of these sources of bias.
In this paper, we use tools from mediation analysis and
causal inference to formalize fairness criteria as constraints
on certain impermissible causal pathways from sensitive
features to actions or outcomes (Nabi & Shpitser, 2018).
Moreover, we describe how all the aforementioned biases
can be addressed by a novel combination of methods from
causal inference, constrained optimization, and semipara-
metric statistics. Our main theoretical result illustrates in
what sense enacting fair policies can “break the cycle of
injustice”: we show how to learn policies such that the joint
distribution induced by these policies (in conjunction with
reward/utility mechanisms outside the policy-maker’s con-
trol) will satisfy specified fairness constraints while remain-
ing “close” to the generating distribution. To our knowl-
edge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to integrate
algorithmic fairness and policy learning with the possible
exception of Jabbari et al. (2017), which addressed what
we call prospective bias in the context of Markov Decision
Processes.
To precisely describe our approach, we must introduce some
necessary concepts and tools from causal inference and
policy learning. Then, we summarize the perspective on
algorithmic fairness in prediction problems from Nabi &
Shpitser (2018), and adapt this framework to learning opti-
mal fair policies. We illustrate our proposal via experiments
on synthetic and real data.
2. Notation and preliminaries
Consider a multi-stage decision problem with K pre-
specified decision points, indexed by k = 1, . . . ,K. Let
Y denote the final outcome of interest and Ak denote the
action made (treatment administered) at decision point k
with the finite state space of Ak. Let X denote the avail-
able information prior to the first decision, and Yk denote
the information collected between decisions k and k + 1,
(Y ≡ YK). Ak represents all treatments administered from
time 1 to k; likewise for Y k. We combine the treatment and
covariate history up to treatment decision Ak into a history
vector Hk. The state space of Hk is denoted by Hk. Note
that while our proposal in this paper applies to arbitrary state
spaces, we present examples with continuous outcomes and
binary decisions for simplicity.
The goal of policy learning is to find policies that map vec-
tors in Hk to values in Ak (for all k) that maximize the
expected value of outcome Y . In offline settings, where
exploration by direct experimentation is impossible, find-
ing such policies requires reasoning counterfactually, as
is common in causal inference. The value of Y under an
assignment of value a to variable A is called a potential out-
come variable, denoted Y (a). In causal inference, quantities
of interest are defined as functions of potential outcomes
(also called counterfactuals). Estimating these functions
from observational data is a challenging task, and requires
assumptions linking potential outcomes to the data actually
observed. Our assumptions can be formally represented
using causal graphs. In a directed acyclic graph (DAG),
nodes correspond to random variables, and directed edges
represent direct causal relationships. As an example, con-
sider the single treatment causal graph of Fig. 1(a). X is
a direct cause of A, and A is both a direct cause of Y as
well as an indirect cause of Y through M . A variable like
M which lies on a causal pathway from A to Y is called
a mediator. For more details on causal graphical models
see, e.g., Spirtes et al. (2001) and Pearl (2009). In what
follows let Z denote the full vector of observed variables in
the causal model, e.g., Z = (Y,M,A,X) in our Fig. 1(a).
A causal parameter is said to be identified in a causal model
if it is a function of the observed data distribution p(Z).
In causal DAGs, distributions of potential outcomes are
identified by the g-formula. For background on general
identification theory, see Shpitser (2018). As an example,
the distribution of Y (a) in the DAG in Fig. 1(a) is identified
by
∑
X,M p(Y |a,M,X)p(M |a,X)p(X). Note that some
causal parameters may be identified even in causal models
with hidden (“latent”) variables, typically represented by
acyclic directed mixed graphs (ADMGs) (Shpitser, 2018).
Though we do not apply our methods to hidden variable
Learning Optimal Fair Policies
models here, the general approach and many of the specific
learning strategies we propose are applicable in contexts
with hidden variables, so long as the relevant parameters are
identified.
In our sequential setting, Y (aK) represents the response
Y had the fixed treatment assignment strategy AK = aK
been followed, possibly contrary to fact. The contrast
E[Y (aK)]−E[Y (a′K)], where aK is the treatment history of
interest and a′K is the reference treatment history, quantifies
the average causal effect of aK on the outcome Y .
Mediation and path-specific analysis
One way to understand the mechanisms by which treatments
influence outcomes is via mediation analysis. The simplest
type of mediation analysis decomposes the causal effect of
A on Y into a direct effect and an indirect effect mediated
by a third variable. Consider the graph in Fig 1(a): the
direct effect corresponds to the path A → Y , and indirect
effect corresponds to the path through M : A → M → Y .
In the potential outcome notation, the direct and indirect
effects can be defined using nested counterfactuals such as
Y (a,M(a′)) for a, a′ ∈ A, which denotes the value of Y
when A is set to a while M is set to whatever value it would
have attained had A been set to a′. Under certain identifica-
tion assumptions discussed by Pearl (2001), the distribution
of Y (a,M(a′)) (and thereby direct and indirect effects)
can be nonparametrically identified from observed data by
the following formula: p(Y (a,M(a′)) =
∑
X,M p(Y |
a,X,M)p(M | a′, X)p(X). More generally, when there
are multiple pathways from A to Y one may define various
path-specific effects (PSEs), which under some assumptions
may be nonparametrically identified by means of the edge g-
formula provided in Shpitser & Tchetgen Tchetgen (2016).
We define a number of PSEs relevant for our examples be-
low. For a general definition, see Shpitser (2013).
Policy counterfactuals and policy learning
Let fA = {fA1 , . . . , fAK} be a sequence of decision rules.
At the kth decision point, the kth rule fAk maps the avail-
able information prior to the kth treatment decision Hk to
treatment decision ak, i.e. fAk : Hk 7→ Ak. Given fA we
define the counterfactual response of Y hadA been assigned
according to fA, or Y (fA), by the following recursive defi-
nition (cf. Robins, 2004; Richardson & Robins, 2013):
Y
({
fAk
(
Hk(fA)
)
: Ak ∈ paG(Y ) ∩A
}
,
{
paG(Y ) \A
}
(fA)
)
.
In words: the potential outcome Y had any parent of Y that
is in A been set to fA in response to counterfactual history
Hk up to k, where this history behaves as if A were set to
fA and any parent of Y that is not in A, behaves as if A
were set to fA.
Under a causal model associated with the DAG G, the distri-
bution p(Y (fA)), is identified by the following generaliza-
tion of the g-formula:
∑
Z\{Y,A}
∏
V∈Z\A
p
(
V |{fAk (Hk) : Ak ∈ paG(V ) ∩ A}, paG(V ) \ A
)
.
As an example, Y (a = fA(X)) in Fig. 1(a) is defined as
Y (a = fA(X),M(a = fA(X), X), X), and its distribu-
tion is identified as
∑
x,m p(Y |a = fA(x),M = m,X =
x)p(M |a = fA(x), X = x)p(X = x).
Given an identified response to a fixed set of policies fA,
we consider search for the optimal policy set f∗A, defined to
be one that maximizes E[Y (fA)]. Since Y (fA) is a coun-
terfactual quantity, validating the found set of policies is
difficult given only retrospective data, with statistical bias
due to model misspecification being a particular worry. This
stands in contrast with online policy learning problems in re-
inforcement learning, where new data under any policy may
be generated and validation is therefore automatic. Partly
in response to this issue, a set of orthogonal methods for
policy learning have been developed that model different
parts of the observed data likelihood function. Q-learning,
value search, and g-estimation are common methods used
in dynamic treatment regimes literature for learning optimal
policies (Chakraborty & Moodie, 2013). We defer detailed
descriptions to later in the paper and the supplement.
3. From fair prediction to fair policies
Nabi & Shpitser (2018) argue that fair inference for predic-
tion requires imposing hard constraints on the prediction
problem, in the form of restricting certain path-specific ef-
fects. We adapt this approach to optimal sequential decision-
making. A feature of this approach is that the relevant re-
strictions are user-specified and context-specific; thus we
will generally require input from policymakers, legal ex-
perts, bioethicists, or the general public in applied settings.
Which pathways may be considered impermissible depends
on the domain and the semantics of the variables involved.
We do not defend this perspective on fairness here for lack
of space; please see Nabi & Shpitser (2018) for more details.
We summarize the proposal from Nabi & Shpitser (2018)
with a brief example, inspired by the aforementioned child
welfare case. Consider a simple causal model for this sce-
nario, shown in Fig. 1(b). Hotline operators receive thou-
sands of calls per year, and must decide on an action A for
each call, e.g., whether or not to send a caseworker. These
decisions are made on the basis of a (high-dimensional)
vectors of covariates X and M , as well as possibly sensitive
features S, such as race. M consists of mediators of the
effect of S on A. Y1 corresponds to an indicator for whether
the child is separated from their family by child protec-
tive services, and Y2 corresponds to child hospitalization
(presumably attributed to domestic abuse or neglect). The
observed joint distribution generated by this causal model
Learning Optimal Fair Policies
X
A
M
Y
(a)
X
S
M
A
Y1 Y2
(b)
X
S
M
A1
Y1
. . .
. . .
AK
YK
(c)
Figure 1. (a) A simple causal DAG, with a single treatment A, a single outcome Y , a vector X of baseline variables, and a single mediator
M . (b) A causal DAG corresponding to our (simplified) child welfare example with baseline factors X , sensitive feature S, action A,
vector of mediators (including e.g. socioeconomic variables, histories of drug treatment)M , an indicator Y1 of whether a child is separated
from their parents, and an indicator of child hospitalization Y2. (d) A multistage decision problem, which corresponds to a complete DAG
over vertices X,S,M,A1, Y1, · · · , AK , YK .
would be p(Y1, Y2, A,M, S,X). The proposal from Nabi
& Shpitser (2018) is that fairness corresponds to the im-
permissibility of certain path-specific effects, and so fair
inference requires decisions to be made from a counterfac-
tual distribution p∗(Y1, Y2, A,M, S,X) which is “nearby”
to p (in the sense of minimal Kullback-Leibler divergence)
but where these PSEs are constrained to be zero. They call
p∗ the distribution generated by a “fair world.”
Multiple fairness concerns have been raised by experts and
advocates in discussions of the child protection decision-
making process (Chouldechova et al., 2018; Hurley, 2018).
For example, it is clearly impermissible that race has any
direct effect on the decision made by the hotline screener,
i.e., that all else being held fixed, members from one group
have a higher probability of being surveilled by the agency.
However, it is perhaps permissible that race has an indirect
effect via some mediated pathway, e.g., if race is associated
with some behaviors or features which themselves ought to
be taken into consideration by hotline staffers, because they
are predictive of abuse. If that’s true, then S → A would be
labeled an impermissible pathway whereas S → M → A
(for some M ) would be permissible. Similarly, it would
be unacceptable if race had an effect on whether children
are separated from their families; arguably both the direct
pathway S → Y1 and indirect pathway though hotline de-
cisions S → A→ Y1 should be considered impermissible.
Rather than defend any particular choice of path-specific
constraints, we note that the framework outlined in Nabi &
Shpitser (2018) can flexibly accommodate any set of given
constraints, as long as the PSEs are identifiable from the
observed distribution.
3.1. Inference in a nearby “fair world”
We now describe the specifics of the proposal. We assume
the data is generated according to some (known) causal
model, with observed data distribution p(·), and that we
can characterize the fair world by a fair distribution p∗(·)
where some set of pre-specified PSEs are constrained to be
zero, or within a tolerance range. Without loss of gener-
ality we can assume the utility variable Y is some deter-
ministic function of Y1 and Y2 (i.e., Y ≡ u(Y1, Y2)) and
thus use Y in place of Y1 and Y2 in what follows. Then
Z = (Y,X, S,M,A) in our child welfare example. For the
purposes of illustration, assume the following two PSEs are
impermissible: PSEsa, corresponding to the direct effect
of S on A and defined as E[A(s,M(s′))] − E[A(s′)], and
PSEsy, corresponding to the effect of S on Y along the
edge S → Y , and the path S → A → Y and defined as
E[Y (s,A(s,M(s′)),M(s′))]− E[Y (s′)].
If the PSEs are identified under the considered causal model,
they can be written as functions of the observed distribution.
For example, the unfair PSE of the sensitive feature S on
outcome Y in our child welfare example may be written
as a functional PSEsy = g1(Z) ≡ g1(p(Y,X, S,M,A)).
Similarly the unfair PSE of S on A is PSEsa = g2(Z) ≡
g2(p(Y,X, S,M,A)). Generally, given a set of identified
PSEs gj(Z) ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J} and corresponding tolerated
lower/upper bounds −j , 
+
j , the fair distribution p
∗(Z) is
defined:
p∗(Z) ≡ argmin
q
DKL(p||q)
subject to −j ≤ gj(Z) ≤ +j , ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}, (1)
where DKL is the KL-divergence and J is the number of
constraints.1 In finite sample settings, Nabi & Shpitser
(2018) propose solving the following constrained maximum
likelihood problem:
α̂ = argmax
α
L(Z;α)
subject to −j ≤ ĝj(Z) ≤ +j , ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}, (2)
where ĝj(Z) are estimators for the chosen PSEs andL(Z;α)
is the likelihood function. The most relevant bounds in
practice are −j = 
+
j = 0.
1Note that in our examples J will typically be K + 1, i.e.,
one constraint for the S to Y paths and one constraint for each
set of paths from S to Ak. We allow for J constraints in general
to accommodate more complex settings (e.g., where there are
multiple sensitive features, multiple outcomes, or a different set of
pathways are constrained).
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Given an approximation of p∗ learned in this way, Nabi &
Shpitser (2018) transform regression problems originally
defined on p into regression problems on p∗. In other words,
instead of learning a regression function E[Y |M,A, S,X]
on the observed data distribution p(Z), they approximate the
fair distribution p∗(Z) by constrained maximum likelihood
and classify new instances using the constrained model. As
we discuss in more detail later, Nabi & Shpitser (2018)
choose to average over certain variables to accomodate the
fact that new instances are generated from p rather than p∗.
3.2. Fair decision-making
In the sequential decision setting, there are multiple compli-
cations. In particular, we aim to learn high-quality policies
while simultaneously making sure that the joint distribution
induced by the policy satisfies our fairness criteria, poten-
tially involving constraints on multiple causal pathways.
This problem must be solved in settings where distributions
of some variables, such as outcomes, are not under the
policy-maker’s control. Finally, we must show that if the
learned policy is adapted to new instances (drawn from the
original observed distribution) in the right way, then these
new instances combined with the learned policy, constrained
variables, and variables outside our control, together form a
joint distribution where our fairness criteria remain satisfied.
Consider aK-stage decision problem given by a DAG where
every vertex pair is connected, and with vertices in a topo-
logical order X,S,M,A1, Y1, . . . , AK , YK . See Fig. 1(c).
Note that the setting where S can be assumed exogenous is
a special case of this model with missing edge between X
and S. Though we only assume a single set of permissible
mediators M here, at the expense of some added cumber-
some notation all of the following can be extended to the
case where there are distinct sets of mediators M1, . . . ,MK
preceding every decision point. (We extend the results be-
low to that setting in the Supplement.) We will consider
the following PSEs as inadmissible: PSEsy, representing
the effect of S on Y along all paths other than the paths of
the form S → M → . . . → Y ; and PSEsak , representing
the effect of S on Ak along all paths other than the paths
of the form S → M → . . . → Ak. That is, we consider
only pathways connecting S and Ak or Y through the al-
lowed mediators M to be fair. In this model, these PSEs are
identified by (Shpitser, 2013):
PSEsy = E[Y (s,M(s′))]− E[Y (s′)]
=
∑
X,M
{E[Y |s,M,X]− E[Y |s′,M,X]}p(M |s′, X)p(X)
PSEsak = E[Ak(s,M(s′))]− E[Ak(s′)]
=
∑
X,M
{E[Ak|s,M,X]− E[Ak|s′,M,X]}p(M |s′, X)p(X)
Numerous approaches for estimating and constraining these
identified PSEs are possible. In this paper, we restrict our
attention to semiparametric estimators, which model only a
part of the likelihood function while leaving the rest com-
pletely unrestricted. Estimators of this sort share some
advantages with parametric methods (e.g., often being uni-
formly consistent at favorable rates), but do not require
specification of the full probability model. Specifically, we
use estimators based on the following result:
Theorem 1 Assume S is binary. Under the causal model
above, the following are consistent estimators of PSEsy and
PSEsak , assuming all models are correctly specified:
ĝsy(Z) = (3)
1
N
N∑
n=1
{ I(Sn = s)
p(Sn|Xn)
p(Mn|s′, Xn)
p(Mn|s,Xn) −
I(Sn = s′)
p(Sn|Xn)
}
Yn
ĝsak (Z) = (4)
1
N
N∑
n=1
{ I(Sn = s)
p(Sn|Xn)
p(Mn|s′, Xn)
p(Mn|s,Xn) −
I(Sn = s′)
p(Sn|Xn)
}
Akn
These inverse probability weighted (IPW) estimators use
models for M and S. Thus, we can approximate p∗ by
constraining only the M and S models, i.e., obtaining
estimates αˆm and αˆs of the parameters αm and αs in
p∗(M |S,X;αm) and p∗(S|X;αs) by solving (2). The out-
comes Yk and decisions Ak are left unconstrained. This is
subtle and important, since it enables us to choose our opti-
mal decision rules f∗A without restriction of the policy space
and allows the mechanism determining outcomes Yk (based
on decisions Ak and history Hk) to remain outside the con-
trol of the policy-maker. Consequently, we can show that
implementing this procedure guarantees that the joint distri-
bution over all variables Z induced by 1) the constrained M
and S models, 2) the conditional distributions for Ak given
Hk implied by the optimal policy choice, and 3) any choice
of p(Yk|Ak, Hk) will (at the population-level) satisfy the
specified fairness constraints. We prove the following result
in the Supplement:
Theorem 2 Consider the K-stage decision problem de-
scribed by the DAG in Fig. 1(c). Let p∗(M |S,X;αm) and
p∗(S|X;αs) be the constrained models chosen to satisfy
PSEsy = 0 and PSEsak = 0. Let p˜(Z) be the joint distri-
bution induced by p∗(M |S,X;αm) and p∗(S|X;αs), and
where all other distributions in the factorization are unre-
stricted. That is,
p˜(Z) ≡ p(X)p∗(S|X;αs)p∗(M |S,X;αm)
×
K∏
k=1
p(Ak|Hk)p(Yk|Ak, Hk).
Then the functionals PSEsy and PSEsai taken w.r.t. p˜(Z)
are also zero.
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This theorem implies that any approach for learning poli-
cies based on p˜(Z) addresses both retrospective bias (since
the fairness criterion violation present in p(Z) is absent in
p˜(Z)) and prospective bias (since the criterion holds in p˜(Z)
for any choice of policy on Ak inducing p(Ak|Hk)). As
we discuss in detail in the next section, modified policy
learning based on p˜(Z) requires special treatment of the
constrained variables S and M . New instances (e.g., new
calls to the child protection hotline) will be drawn from the
unfair distribution p, not p˜. So, the enacted policy cannot
use empirically observed values of S or M . In what follows,
our approach is to either average over S and M (following
Nabi & Shpitser (2018)), or resample observations of S and
M from the constrained models.
4. Estimation of optimal policies in the fair
world
In the following, we describe several strategies for learning
optimal policies, and our modifications to these strategies
based on the above fairness considerations.
4.1. Q-learning
In Q-learning, the optimal policy is chosen to optimize a
sequence of counterfactual expectations called Q-functions.
These are defined recursively in terms of value functions
Vk(·) as follows:
QK(HK , AK) = E[YK(AK) | HK ],
VK(HK) = max
aK
QK(HK , aK), (5)
and for k = K − 1, . . . , 1
Qk(Hk, Ak) = E[Vk+1(Hk+1, Ak) | Hk],
Vk(Hk) = max
ak
Qk(Hk, ak). (6)
Assuming Qk(Hk, Ak) is parameterized by βk, the optimal
policy at each stage may be easily derived from Q-functions
as f∗Ak(Hk) = argmaxak Qk(Hk, ak; β̂k). Q-functions
are recursively defined regression models where outcomes
are value functions, and features are histories up to the
current decision point. Thus, parameters βk (k = 1, . . . ,K)
of all Q-functions may be learned recursively by maximum
likelihood methods applied to regression at stage k, given
that the value function at stage k + 1 was already computed
for every row. See Chakraborty & Moodie (2013) for more
details.
Note that at each stage k, the identity Qk(Hk, Ak) =
E[Vk+1(Hk+1, Ak) | Hk] = E[Vk+1(Hk+1) | Ak, Hk]
only holds under our causal model if the entire past Hk
is conditioned on. In particular, E[Vk+1(Hk+1, Ak) |
Hk \ {M,S}] 6= E[Vk+1(Hk+1) | Ak, Hk \ {M,S}]. To
see a simple example of this, note that YK(a1) is not inde-
pendent of A1 conditional on just X in Fig. 1(c), due to the
presence of the path YK ←M → A1; however the indepe-
nence does hold conditional on the entire H1 = {X,S,M}
(Richardson & Robins, 2013).
In a fair policy learning setting, though {M,S} may be
in Hk, we cannot condition on values of M,S to learn fair
policies since these values were drawn from p rather than p∗.
There are multiple ways of addressing this issue. One ap-
proach is to modify the procedure to obtain optimal policies
that condition on all history other than {M,S}. We first
learn Qks using (5) and (6). We then provide the following
modified definition of Q-functions defined directly on p∗:
Q∗k(Hk \ {M,S}, Ak;βk) =
1
Z
∑
m,s
Qk(Hk, Ak;βk)
k∏
i=1
p(Ai|Hi \ {M,S},m, s).
k−1∏
i=2
p(Mi|Ai, Hi \ {M,S},m, s) p∗(m, s|X),
for k = K, . . . , 1,
Z =
∑
m,s
p∗(m, s|X)
k∏
i=1
p(Ai|Hi \ {M,S},m, s)
k−1∏
i=2
p(Mi|Ai, Hi \ {M,S},m, s).
The optimal fair policy at each stage is then derived
from Q∗-functions as f∗Ak(Hk) = argmaxak Q
∗
k(Hk \
{M,S}, ak; β̂k).
As an alternative approach, we can compute the original
Q-functions defined in (5) and (6) with respect to p∗(Z)
by ignoring the observed values Mn and Sn for the nth
individual and replacing them with samples drawn from
p∗(M |S,X;αm) and p∗(S|X;αs). Then, in (5) and (6),
the history at the kth stage, Hk, gets replaced with H∗k =
{Hk \ {M,S},M∗, S∗}.
4.2. Value search
It may be of interest to estimate the optimal policy within
a restricted class F . One approach to learning the optimal
policy within F is to directly search for the optimal f∗,FA ≡
argmaxfA∈F E[Y (fA)], which is known as value search.
The expected response to an arbitrary policy φ = E[Y (fA)],
for fA ∈ F can be estimated in a number of ways. Often
φ̂ takes the form of a solution to some estimating equation
E[h(φ)] = 0 solved empirically given samples from p(Z).
A simple estimator for φ that uses only the treatment as-
signment model pi(Hk;ψ) ≡ p(Ak = 1|Hk) is the IPW
estimator that solves the following estimating equation:
E
[
K∏
k=1
{
CfAk /pifAk (Hk; ψ̂)
}
× Y − φ
]
= 0, (7)
where CfAk ≡ I(Ak = fAk(Hk)), pifAk (Hk;ψ) ≡
pi(Hk;ψ)fAk(Hk) + (1 − pi(Hk;ψ))(1 − fAk(Hk)), the
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expectation is evaluated empirically, and ψ̂ is fit by maxi-
mum likelihood.
Finding fair policies via value search involves solving the
same problem with respect to p∗(Z) instead. Given known
models p∗(M |S,X;αm) and p∗(S|X;αs), we may con-
sider two approaches. The first one involves solving a modi-
fied estimating equation of the form
E∗[h(φ)] ≡
E
[∑
m,s
E[h(φ)|M,S,X]p∗(M |S,X;αm)p∗(S|X;αs)
]
= 0
with respect to p∗(Z \ {M,S}). The alternative is to
solve the original estimating equation E[h(φ)] = 0 with
respect to p∗(Z) by replacing observed values Mn and
Sn for the nth individual with sampled values M∗n and
S∗n drawn from p
∗(M |S,X;αm) and p∗(S|X;αs). In
both approaches, the optimal fair policy at each stage is
then derived by replacing the history at the kth stage, Hk,
with H∗k = {Hk \ {M,S},M∗, S∗}. Given constrained
models p∗(M |S,X;αm), and p∗(S|X;αs) representing
p∗(Z), we can perform value search by solving the given
estimating equation empirically on a dataset where ev-
ery row xn, sn,mn in the data is replaced with I rows
xn, s
∗
ni,m
∗
ni for i = 1, . . . I , with m
∗
ni and s
∗
ni drawn from
p∗(M |S, xn;αm) and p∗(S|xn;αs), respectively.
4.3. G-estimation
A third method for estimating policies is to directly model
the counterfactual contrasts known as optimal blip-to-zero
functions and then learn these functions by a method called
g-estimation (Robins, 2004). In the interest of space, we
defer a full description of blip-to-zero functions and g-
estimation to the Supplement, where we also present some
results for our implementation of fair g-estimation.
4.4. Tradeoffs and treatment of constrained variables
We’ve proposed to constrain the M and S models to satisfy
given fairness constraints. Since empirically observed val-
ues of M and S are sampled from p rather than p∗ (or p˜),
our approach requires resampling or averaging over these
features. The choice of models to constrain involves a trade-
off. The more models are constrained, the closer the KL
distance between p and p∗, but the more features have to be
resampled or averaged out; that is, some information on new
instances is “lost.” Alternative approaches may constrain
fewer or different models in the likelihood (for example, we
could have elected to constrain the Y model instead of S).
However, the benefit of our approach here is that we can
guarantee, with outcomes Y outside the policy-maker’s con-
trol, that the induced joint distribution will satisfy the given
fairness constraints (by Theorem 2), whereas alternative
procedures which aim to avoid averaging or resampling will
typically have no such guarantees. Another alternative that
avoids averaging over variables altogether is to consider like-
lihood parameterizations where the absence of a given PSE
directly corresponds to setting some variation-independent
likelihood parameter for the Y model to zero (cf. Chiappa
(2019)). While such a parameterization is possible for linear
structural equation models, it is an open problem in general
for arbitrary PSEs and nonlinear settings. Developing novel,
general-purpose alternatives that transfer observed distribu-
tions to their “fair versions,” while avoiding resampling and
averaging, is an open problem left to future work.
5. Experiments
Synthetic data
We generated synthetic data for a two-stage decision prob-
lem according to the causal model shown in Fig. 1(c)
(K = 2), where all variables are binary except for the
continuous response utility Y ≡ Y2. Details on the specific
models used are reported in the Supplement. We generated a
dataset of size 5, 000, with 100 bootstrap replications, where
the sensitive variable S is randomly assigned and where S
is chosen to be an informative covariate in estimating Y .
We use estimators in Theorem 1 to compute PSEsy , PSEsa1 ,
and PSEsa2 which entail using M and S models. In this
setting, the PSEsy is 1.918 (on the mean scale) and is re-
stricted to lie between −0.1 and 0.1. The PSEsa1 is 0.718,
and PSEsa2 is 0.921 (on the odds ratio scale) and both are
restricted to lie between 0.95 and 1.05. We only constrain
M and S models to approximate p∗ and fit these two mod-
els by maximizing the constrained likelihood using the R
package nloptr. The parameters in all other models were
estimated by maximizing the likelihood.
Optimal fair polices along with optimal (unfair) policies
were estimated using the two techniques described in Sec-
tion 4 (where we used the “averaging” approach in both
cases). We evaluated the performance of both techniques by
comparing the population-level response under fair policies
versus unfair policies. One would expect the unfair policies
to lead to higher expected outcomes compared to fair poli-
cies since satisfying fairness constraints requires sacrificing
some policy effectiveness. The expected outcomes under
unfair polices obtained from Q-learning and value search
were 7.219±0.005 and 7.622±0.265, respectively. The
values dropped to 6.104±0.006 and 6.272±0.133 under fair
polices, as expected. In addition, both fair and unfair opti-
mal polices had higher expected outcomes than the observed
population-level outcome, using both methods. In our sim-
ulations, the population outcome under observed policies
was 4.82±0.007. Some additional results are reported in
the Supplement.
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Application to the COMPAS dataset
COMPAS is a criminal justice risk assessment tool created
by the company Northpointe that has been used across the
US to determine whether to release or detain a defendant
before their trial. Each pretrial defendant receives several
COMPAS scores based on factors including but not limited
to demographics, criminal history, family history, and social
status. Among these scores, we are primarily interested
in the “risk of recidivism.” We use the data made avail-
able by Propublica and described in Angwin et al. (2016).
The COMPAS risk score for each defendant ranges from
1 to 10, with 10 being the highest risk. In addition to this
score (A), the data also includes records on defendants age
(X1 ∈ X), gender (X2 ∈ X), race (S), prior convictions
(M ), and whether or not recidivism occurred in a span
of two years (R). We limited our attention to the cohort
consisting of African-Americans and Caucasians, and to in-
dividuals who either had not been arrested for a new offense
or who had recidivated within two years. Our sample size is
5278. All variables were binarized including the COMPAS
score, which we treat as an indicator of a binary decision to
incarcerate versus release (pretrial) “high risk” individuals,
i.e., we assume those with score ≥ 7 were incarcerated. In
this data, 28.9% of individuals had scores ≥ 7.
Since the data does not include any variable that corresponds
to utility, and there is no uncontroversial definition of what
function one should optimize, we define a heuristic utility
function from the data as follows. We assume there is some
(social, economic, and human) cost, i.e., negative utility,
associated with incarceration (deciding A = 1), and that
there is some cost to releasing individuals who go on to
reoffend (i.e., for whom A = 0 and R = 1). Also, there is
positive utility associated with releasing individuals who do
not go on to recidivate (i.e., for whom A = 0 and R = 0).
A crucial feature of any realistic utility function is how to
balance these relative costs, e.g., how much (if any) “worse”
it is to release an individual who goes on to reoffend than to
incarcerate them. To model these considerations we define
utility Y ≡ (1−A)× {−θR+ (1−R)} −A. The utility
function is thus parameterized by θ, which quantifies how
much “worse” is the case where individuals are released
and reoffend as compared with the other two possibilities
which are treated symmetrically. We emphasize that this
utility function is a heuristic we use to illustrate our optimal
policy learning method, and that a realistic utility function
would be much more complicated (possibly depending also
on factors not recorded in the available data).
We apply our proposed Q-learning procedure to optimize
E[Y ], assuming K = 1 and exogenous S. The fair policy
constrains the S → A and S → Y pathways. We describe
details of our implementation as well as additional results in
the Supplement. The proportion of individuals incarcerated
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Utility Parameter
In
ca
rc
er
a
tio
n 
R
at
e
1 2 3 4
Optimal unrestricted policy
Optimal fair policy
Observed policy
African−American
Caucasian
Figure 2. Group-level incarceration rates for the COMPAS data as
a function of the utility parameter θ.
(A = 1) is a function of θ, which we plot in Fig. 2 stratified
by racial group. See the Supplement for results on overall
incerceration rates, which also vary among the policies. The
region of particular interest is between θ = 2 and 3, where
fair and unrestricted optimal policies differ and both recom-
mend lower-than-observed overall incarceration rates (see
Supplement). For most θ values, the fair policy recommends
a decision rule which narrows the racial gap in incarceration
rates as compared with the unrestricted policy, though does
not eliminate this gap entirely. (Constraining the causal
effects of race through mediator M would go further in
eliminating this gap.) In regions where θ > 3, both optimal
policies in fact recommend higher-than-observed overall
incarceration rates but a narrower racial gap, particularly
for the fair policy. Comparing fair and unconstrained policy
learning on this data serves to simultaneously illustrate how
the proposed methods can be applied to real problems and
how the choice of utility function is not innocuous.
6. Conclusion
We have extended a formalization of algorithmic fairness
from Nabi & Shpitser (2018) to the setting of learning op-
timal policies under fairness constraints. We show how
to constrain a set of statistical models and learn a policy
such that subsequent decision making given new observa-
tions from the “unfair world” induces high-quality outcomes
while satisfying the specified fairness constraints in the in-
duced joint distribution. In this sense, our approach can be
said to “break the cycle of injustice” in decision-making.
We investigated the performance of our proposals on syn-
thetic and real data, where in the latter case we have supple-
mented the data with a heuristic utility function. In future
work, we hope to develop and implement more sophisti-
cated constrained optimization methods, to use information
as efficiently as possible while satisfying the desired theo-
retical guarantee, and to explore nonparametric techniques
for complex settings where the likelihood is not known.
Learning Optimal Fair Policies
Acknowledgments
This project is sponsored in part by the National Institutes of
Health grant R01 AI127271-01 A1 and the Office of Naval
Research grant N00014-18-1-2760.
References
Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., and Kirchner, L. Machine
bias: There’s software used across the country to predict future
criminals. and it’s biased against blacks. Propublica, 2016.
Bertsekas, D. P. and Tsitsiklis, J. Neuro-Dynamic Programming.
Athena Publishing, 1996.
Chakraborty, B. and Moodie, E. E. Statistical Methods for Dy-
namic Treatment Regimes: Reinforcement Learning, Causal
Inference, and Personalized Medicine. New York: Springer-
Verlag, 2013.
Chiappa, S. Path-specific counterfactual fairness. In Proceedings
of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2019.
Chouldechova, A., Benavides-Prado, D., Fialko, O., and Vaithi-
anathan, R. A case study of algorithm-assisted decision making
in child maltreatment hotline screening decisions. In Conference
on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, pp. 134–148,
2018.
Corbett-Davies, S., Pierson, E., Feller, A., Goel, S., and Huq, A.
Algorithmic decision making and the cost of fairness. In Pro-
ceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 797–806, 2017.
Feldman, M., Friedler, S. A., Moeller, J., Scheidegger, C., and
Venkatasubramanian, S. Certifying and removing disparate
impact. In Proceedings of the 21th ACM SIGKDD International
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 259–
268, 2015.
Hardt, M., Price, E., and Srebro, N. Equality of opportunity
in supervised learning. In Advances In Neural Information
Processing Systems, pp. 3315–3323, 2016.
Hurley, D. Can an algorithm tell when kids are in danger? The
New York Times, 2018.
Jabbari, S., Joseph, M., Kearns, M., Morgenstern, J., , and Roth, A.
Fairness in reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, 2017.
Kamiran, F., Zliobaite, I., and Calders, T. Quantifying explainable
discrimination and removing illegal discrimination in automated
decision making. Knowledge and Information Systems, 35(3):
613–644, 2013.
Kusner, M. J., Loftus, J. R., Russell, C., and Silva, R. Counterfac-
tual fairness. In Advances In Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2017.
Mitchell, S. and Shalden, J. Reflections on quantitative
fairness. https://speak-statistics-to-power.
github.io/fairness/, 2018.
Nabi, R. and Shpitser, I. Fair inference on outcomes. In Pro-
ceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 2018.
Pearl, J. Direct and indirect effects. In Proceedings of the Seven-
teenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pp.
411–420, 2001.
Pearl, J. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge
University Press, 2nd edition, 2009.
Pedreshi, D., Ruggieri, S., and Turini, F. Discrimination-aware data
mining. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM SIGKDD International
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 560–
568, 2008.
Richardson, T. S. and Robins, J. M. Single world intervention
graphs (SWIGs): A unification of the counterfactual and graph-
ical approaches to causality. Preprint: http://www.csss.
washington.edu/Papers/wp128.pdf, 2013.
Robins, J. M. Optimal structural nested models for optimal sequen-
tial decisions. In Proceedings of the Second Seattle Symposium
on Biostatistics, pp. 189–326, 2004.
Shpitser, I. Counterfactual graphical models for longitudinal medi-
ation analysis with unobserved confounding. Cognitive Science
(Rumelhart special issue), 37:1011–1035, 2013.
Shpitser, I. Identification in graphical causal models. In Handbook
of Graphical Models. CRC Press, 2018.
Shpitser, I. and Tchetgen Tchetgen, E. J. Causal inference with a
graphical hierarchy of interventions. Annals of Statistics, 44(6):
2433–2466, 2016.
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R. Causation, Prediction,
and Search. MIT Press, 2nd edition, 2001.
Sutton, R. and Barto, A. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction.
MIT press, 1998.
Zhang, J. and Bareinboim, E. Fairness in decision-making – the
causal explanation formula. In Proceedings of the Thirty-Second
AAAI Conference on Association for the Advancement of Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 2018.
Zhang, L., Wu, Y., and Wu, X. A causal framework for discovering
and removing direct and indirect discrimination. In Proceedings
of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pp. 3929–3935, 2017.
Supplemental Appendix for “Learning Optimal Fair Policies”
Razieh Nabi 1 Daniel Malinsky 1 Ilya Shpitser 1
Appendix A: G-estimation
G-estimation applies to structural nested models, which di-
rectly model the counterfactual deviations in outcome from
a reference treatment value (which we take to be A = 0)
conditional on history, assuming all future decisions are
already optimal. Specifically, for each decision point k we
posit a structural nested mean model (SNMM) parameter-
ized by ψ as follows:
γk(Hk,ak;ψ) =
E[Y (a¯k−1, ak, f∗Ak+1)− Y (a¯k−1, ak = 0, f
∗
Ak+1
) | Hk],
where Ak+1 represents all treatments administered from
time k + 1 onwards. In words, γk is the contrast of the
counterfactual mean (conditional on observed history Hk)
where the past decisions are set to their observed values, the
present decision is either ak or a reference decision ak = 0,
and all future decisions are made optimally, f∗Ak+1 .
Note that if the true γk(Hk, ak;ψ) were known, the opti-
mal treatment policies are those that maximize this “blip”
function at each stage: f∗Ak = arg maxak γk(Hk, ak;ψ). In
order to estimate ψ using data, let
U(ψ, ζ(ψ), α) =
K∑
k=1
{Gk(ψ)− E [Gk(ψ) | Hk; ζ]}
× {dk(Hk, Ak)− E [dk(Hk, Ak) | Hk;α]} ,
(1)
where dk(Hk, Ak) is any function ofHk andAk andGk(ψ)
is defined as
Y − γk(Hk, ak;ψ) +
K∑
i=k+1
[γi(Hi, a
∗
i ;ψ)− γi(Hi, ai;ψ)] ,
(a∗i is the optimal decision at ith stage). Consistent estima-
tors of ψ can be obtained solving the estimating equations
E[U(ψ, ζ(ψ), α)] = 0, as shown in Robins (2004).
Both of the modifications discussed for Q-learning and
value search must be applied when learning fair optimal
1Department of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, Baltimore, MD, USA. Correspondence to: Razieh Nabi <rn-
abi@jhu.edu>.
Proceedings of the 36 th International Conference on Machine
Learning, Long Beach, California, PMLR 97, 2019. Copyright
2019 by the author(s).
policies by g-estimation. Specifically, we determine opti-
mal polities not from the SNMM contrast γk(Hk, ak;ψ) =
E[Y (a¯k−1, ak, f∗Ak+1) − Y (a¯k−1, ak = 0, f∗Ak+1) | Hk]
itself, but rather from a modified contrast γ∗k(Hk \
M,ak;ψ) =
∑
m,s γk(Hk, ak;ψ)p
∗(M |S,X)p∗(S|X) =
E[Y (a¯k−1, ak, f∗Ak+1) − Y (a¯k−1, ak = 0, f∗Ak+1) | Hk \
{M,S}] which does not use M and S. This is analogous to
removing M and S from the Q-functions defined in Section
4 and is done for the same reason: M,S are drawn from
p(Z), not p∗(Z).
Second, the estimating equations for ψ must use constrained
models (in particular for M and S), and must be empiri-
cally solved using observations only from p∗(Z). As was
done with value search, we solve equation (1) empirically
using a dataset where each row xn, sn,mn is replaced by
I rows of the form xn, s∗ni,m
∗
ni, i = 1, . . . , I , with s
∗
ni
and m∗ni drawn from p
∗(S|xn;αs) and p∗(M |xn, S;αm),
respectively.
Appendix B: Simulation details and
additional results on synthetic data
Here we report the precise parameter settings used in our
simulation studies. The following regression models were
used in our simulation study of the two-stage decision prob-
lem:
X1 ∼ |N (0, 1)|
(X2, X3) ∼ N (0, diag(2))
S ∼ Bernoulli(p = 0.5)
logit(p(M = 1)) ∼ −1 +X1 +X2 +X3 + S
+ 3SX1 + SX2 + SX3
logit(p(A1 = 1)) ∼ 1−X1 +X2 + S +M − SX1 + SX2
+MS − 3MX1 + 0.5MX2
logit(p(Y1 = 1)) ∼ −2 +X1 +X2 + S +M +A
+ SX2 +MS +AS +AM
logit(p(A2 = 1)) ∼ 1−X1 +X2 +M +A+W
+ S(1−X1 +X2 +M −A)
− 3MX1 + 0.5MX2 −AX1 −AX2
Y = 2.5 +X1 +X2 +M +W +B
+ S(1 +X1 +X2 +M +A+W )
+A(1 +M − 2W ) +MW
+B(−X1 + 2X2 −M) +WX1 +N (0, 1)
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Unfair Policy Fair Policy
Q-learning 1.414±0.0056 1.189±0.0059
value search 1.134±0.0245 1.056±0.0299
g-estimation 1.375±0.0099 1.312±0.0102
Table 1. Comparison of population outcomes E[Y ] under policies
learned by different methods. The value under the observed policy
was 0.24±0.006.
For this two-stage setting we estimated the optimal poli-
cies using Q-learning and value search. In value search, we
considered restricted class of polices of the form p(A1 =
1|X,S,M) = −1 + αxX + αsS + αmM + αsxSX +
αsmSM + αmxMX , and p(A2 = 1|X,S,M,A1, Y1) =
−1 + αxX + αsS + αmM + αaA + αy1Y1 + αsxSX +
αsmSM+αmxMX+αasAS+αaxAX where all αs range
from −3 to 3 by 0.5 increments and estimated the value of
policies for each combination of αs using equation (??).
A third method for estimating policies is to directly model
the counterfactual contrasts known as optimal blip-to-zero
functions and then learn these functions by g-estimation
(Robins, 2004); see Appendix A. We implemented our mod-
ified fair g-estimation for a single-stage decision problem
and compared the results with Q-learning and value search.
The results are provided in Table 1. The data generating
process for the single-stage decision problem matches the
causal model shown in Fig. ??(a) where X,S,M, and A
were generated the same way as described above. The out-
come Y was generated from a standard normal distribution
with mean −2 +X + S +M +A− 3SX2 +MS +AS +
AM + AX2 + AX3. We used estimators in Theorem ??
to compute PSEsy and PSEsa which require using M and
S models. In this synthetic data, the PSEsy was 1.618 (on
the mean scale) and was restricted to lie between −0.1 and
0.1. The PSEsa was 0.685 (on the odds ratio scale) and was
restricted to lie between 0.95 and 1.05.
Appendix C: Details and additional results on
the COMPAS data experiment
The regression models we used in the COMPAS data analy-
sis were specified as follows:
logit(p(M = 1)) ∼ X1 +X2 + S + SX1 + SX2
logit(p(A = 1)) ∼ X1 +X2 + S +M + SX1
+ SX2 +MS +MX1 +MX2
Y ∼ X1 +X2 + S +M +A+ SX1 + SX2
+AS +AM +MS +MX1 +MX2
+AX1 +AX2
For estimating the PSEs which we constrain, we used the
same IPW estimators described in the main paper and repro-
duced in the theorem below. We constrained the PSEs to lie
between −0.05 and 0.05 and 0.95 and 1.05, respectively.
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Figure 3. Overall incarceration rates for the COMPAS data as a
function of the utility parameter θ.
In Fig. 3, we compare the overall incarceration rates rec-
ommended by the optimal fair and unconstrained policies
on the COMPAS data, as a function of the utility param-
eter θ. For low values of θ the incarceration rate is zero,
and becomes higher as θ increases, but differentially for
the fair and unconstrained optimal policies. The difference
between the policies depends crucially on the utility func-
tion. For some values of the utility parameter, the unfair and
fair policies coincide, but for other values we would expect
significantly different overall incarceration rates as well as
different disparities between racial groups (see result in the
main paper).
In Fig. 4, we show the relative utility achieved by the op-
timal fair and unconstrained policies, as well as the utility
of the observed decision pattern, as a function of θ. As
expected, choosing an optimal policy improves on the ob-
served policy, with the unfair (unconstrained) choice being
higher utility than the fair (constrained) choice; we sacrifice
some optimality to satisfy the fairness constraints. However,
the difference depends on the utility parameter and for a
range of parameter values the fair and unfair policies are
nearly the same in terms of optimality (even when they may
disagree on the resulting incarceration rate, around θ = 2.6).
The fair and unfair policies drift far apart in terms of utility
around θ = 3, when the policies recommend an incarcer-
ation rate comparable to or higher than the observed rate.
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Figure 4. The relative utility of policies for the COMPAS data as a
function of the utility parameter θ.
Appendix D: Proofs
Theorem 1 Assume S is binary. Under the causal model
above, the following are consistent estimators of PSEsy and
PSEsak , assuming all models are correctly specified:
ĝsy(Z) = (2)
1
N
N∑
n=1
{ I(Sn = s)
p(Sn|Xn)
p(Mn|s′, Xn)
p(Mn|s,Xn) −
I(Sn = s′)
p(Sn|Xn)
}
Yn
ĝsak (Z) = (3)
1
N
N∑
n=1
{ I(Sn = s)
p(Sn|Xn)
p(Mn|s′, Xn)
p(Mn|s,Xn) −
I(Sn = s′)
p(Sn|Xn)
}
Akn
Proof: The latent projection (Verma and Pearl, 1990) of
any K stage DAG onto X,S,M,A, Y suffices to identify
and estimate the two path-specific effects in question, and
this latent projection is the complete DAG with topological
ordering X,S,M,A, Y . The consistency of the estimators
above then follows directly from derivations in (Tchetgen
Tchetgen and Shpitser, 2014). As an example, we have the
following derivation for the first term of gsy(Z):∑
X,M
E [Y |s,M,X] p(M |s′, X)p(X)
=
∑
X,M,A,Y
Y p(Y |s,M,A,X)p(A|s,M,X)p(M |s′, X)p(X)
=
∑
X,S,M,A,Y
I(S = s)p(M |s′, X)
p(S|X)p(M |s,X) Y dp(Y, S,M,A,X)
= E
[
I(S = s)p(M |s′, X)
p(S|X)p(M |s,X) Y
]
which is precisely the identifying functional for the first term
of the PSE we are interested in. That the above estimator is
consistent for this functional is a standard result. 
Theorem 2 Consider the K-stage decision problem de-
scribed by the DAG in Fig 1c. Let p∗(M |S,X;αm) and
p∗(S|X;αs) be the constrained models chosen to satisfy
PSEsy = 0 and PSEsak = 0. Let p˜(Z) be the joint distri-
bution induced by p∗(M |S,X;αm) and p∗(S|X;αs), and
where all other distributions in the factorization are unre-
stricted. That is,
p˜(Z) ≡ p(X)p∗(S|X;αs)p∗(M |S,X;αm)
×
K∏
k=1
p(Ak|Hk)p(Yk|Ak, Hk).
Then the functionals PSEsy and PSEsak taken w.r.t. p˜(Z)
are also zero.
Proof: Let Y ≡ YK . Because M preceeds all Ak, Yk for
k = 1, . . .K, it suffices to consider the latent projection
with only variables X,S,M,A, Y without affecting identi-
fiability considerations. Then we have the following:
P˜SE
sy
= E˜[Y (s,M(s′))]− E˜[Y (s′)]
=
∑
X,M
{E˜[Y |s,M,X]− E˜[Y |s′,M,X]}p∗(M |s′, X;αm)p(X)
=
∑
X,M
{E[Y |s,M,X]− E[Y |s′,M,X]}p∗(M |s′, X;αm)p(X)
=
∑
X,M,Y
Y {p(Y |s,M,X)− p(Y |s′,M,X)}p∗(M |s′, X;αm)p(X)
=
∑
X,S,M,Y
Y
{ I(S = s)
p∗(S|X;αs)
p∗(M |s′, X;αm)
p∗(M |s,X;αm) −
I(S = s′)
p∗(S|X;αs)
}
× p(Y |M,S,X)p∗(M |S,X;αm)p∗(S|X;αs)p(X)
= 0
by choice of p∗(M |S,X;αm) and p∗(S|X;αs). The proof
is structurally the same for P˜SE
sak
. 
Appendix E: Modified results with multiple
sets of mediators
In the main paper, we discussed aK-stage decision problem
with one set of permissible mediators, M . Here, we extend
those results to the setting where we have multiple sets of
mediators M1, . . . ,MK , i.e., a DAG with topological order-
ing X,S,M1, A1, Y1, . . . ,MK , AK , YK . In this case, we
consider the following paths impermissible: PSEsy, repre-
senting the effect of S on Y along all paths other than the
paths of the form S →Mk → . . .→ Y (∀k); and PSEsak ,
representing the effect of S on Ak along all paths other than
the paths of the form S →Mj → . . .→ Ak (∀j ≤ k). That
is, we consider only pathways connecting S and Ak or Y
through the allowed mediators M1, . . . ,MK to be fair. In
this case, the PSEs are identified by a modification of the
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previous formula given in Section 3.2.
PSEsy = E[Y (s,M1(s′), . . . ,MK(s′))]− E[Y (s′)]
=
∑
x,mK ,aK−1,yK−1,
{E[Y |s,MK , AK−1, Y K−1, X]
− E[Y |s′,MK , AK−1, Y K−1, X]}
K∏
k=1
p(Mk|s′, Ak−1, Y k−1, X)
×
K−1∏
k=1
p(Ak|s,Mk, Ak−1, Y k, X)p(Yk|s,Mk, Ak, Y k−1, X)p(X)
PSEsak = E[Ak(s,M1(s′), . . . ,MK(s′))]− E[Ak(s′)]
=
∑
x,mk,ak−1,yk−1,
{E[Ak|s,Mk, Ak−1, Y k−1, X]
− E[Ak|s′,Mk, Ak−1, Y k−1, X]}
K∏
k=1
p(Mk|s′, Ak−1, Y k−1, X)
×
k−1∏
j=1
p(Aj |s,M j , Aj−1, Y j , X)p(Yj |s,M j , Aj , Y j−1, X)p(X)
With these definitions, we can replace the estimators in
Theorem 1 with:
ĝsy(Z) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
{ I(Sn = s)
p(Sn|Xn)
K∏
k=1
p(Mk,n|s′, Ak−1,n, Y k−1,n, Xn)
p(Mk,n|s,Ak−1,n, Y k−1,n, Xn)
− I(Sn = s
′)
p(Sn|Xn)
}
Yn
ĝsak (Z) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
{ I(Sn = s)
p(Sn|Xn)
K∏
k=1
p(Mk,n|s′, Ak−1,n, Y k−1,n, Xn)
p(Mk,n|s,Ak−1,n, Y k−1,n, Xn)
− I(Sn = s
′)
p(Sn|Xn)
}
Akn
Then, in Theorem 2 we analogously define p˜(Z) as follows:
p˜(Z) ≡ p(X)p∗(S|X;αs)
K∏
k=1
{
p∗(Mk|S,Ak−1, Y k−1, X;αm)
× p(Ak|Hk)p(Yk|Ak, Hk)
}
.
In this case we constrain the S and Mk models ∀k, the rest
of the procedure remaining the same. Aside from the form
of the identifying functional, the proofs of modified versions
of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are analogous.
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